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Abstract 
The question of the credibility of the 2014 Ekiti state governorship election in Nigeria is still a subject of 
ongoing controversy despite the report of both local and international observers which declared the election free 
and fair. Temitope Aluko, the former secretary of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the party that won the 
election had revealed how the party used the military to rig the governorship election in favour of the PDP. He 
provided evidence on how the PDP governorship candidate, Ayodele Fayose lobbied two government ministers; 
the Minister of State for Defense Musiliu Obanikoro and the Minister of Police Affairs Jelili Adesiyan--to 
convince the former President Goodluck Jonathan to support their rigging plot which became known as Ekitigate.  
A Nigerian army captain had earlier leaked an audio tape about the alleged election rigging. The secret recording, 
allegedly contained a discussion the Nigerian ministers had with an army General to rig the Ekiti election.This 
paper revisits the Ekiti governorship election to decipher whether the alleged rigging had altered the outcome of 
the election in which the incumbent governor lost or whether the outcome would still have been the same 
without the rigging. This paper is significant because it will clear the air on the impact of the alleged rigging on 
the outcome of that election. The paper adopts content analysis of scanty extant literatures on the subject, media 
reports as well as field interviews of major actors.  
Keywords: Ekiti, Ekitigate, Fayose, Fayemi, Governorship election, Democracy 
 
1. Introduction 
The June 2014 governorship election in Ekiti state, southwest Nigeria, was critical for many reasons; it was one 
of the few governorship elections to be held before the 2015 general elections. Hence, it was a test-run for the 
Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) preparedness to conduct a credible general election in 
2015. The Ekiti election also represented an opportunity both for the PDP to gain a crucial foothold in the 
opposition dominant southwest before it was to face its most determined challenge in 2015 and for the All 
Progressive Congress (APC) to demonstrate its credibility and shore up its mandate in the heart of its traditional 
stronghold. The Ekiti governorship election was an ‘off term’ election because of the long judicial process that 
eventually brought about the declaration of the incumbent governor, Kayode Fayemi as the winner of the 2007 
election three years after that election. The earlier governorship election held in Anambra state in 2013 had been 
fraught with all manners of election malpractices. 
Governor Fayemi’s decisive loss to Ayodele Fayose of the PDP in that election was unprecedented in 
the political kernel of Nigeria. Fayemi lost in all the 16 Local Government Areas (LGA) of the state. The 
election was hailed as free and fair by both local and international observers and INEC was hailed as having 
organized a credible election. With the victory of the opposition in the state, and the return of Fayose, who had 
earlier been impeached in 2003, Nigeria’s democracy was believed to have advanced. But with the change of 
government at the federal level in 2015, different revelations began to surface that the election was anything but 
free and fair after all.  
A Nigerian army captain, Sagir Koli who was deployed in the state during the election, leaked an audio 
recording about alleged rigging of the Ekiti State election. The audio was a secret recording of discussions by 
two government ministers, an Army General and the PDP candidate about how to intimidate the opposition and 
rig the election. The video recording revealed the connivance of General, Aliyu Momoh, the then Minister of 
State for Defence, Musiliu Obanikoro, then Minister of Police Affairs, Jelili Adesiyan, then PDP governorship 
candidate who eventually won the election, Ayodele Fayose, and two other chieftains of the PDP, Senators Andy 
Uba and Iyiola Omisore to rig the 2014 election in Ekiti state. The Nigerian military set up a panel of inquiry 
into allegations of unprofessional conduct against soldiers during the Ekiti elections. The panel recommended 
that three officers should lose their commands and another was recommended for prosecution for collecting 
financial gratification. (Ibekwe, 2016). 
Even though the PDP denied allegations of rigging, its former secretary in Ekiti state, Tope Aluko who 
had earlier denied the claim had confessed to it in a series of TV interviews as he described how Fayose, 
Obanikoro, and Adesiyan agreed to enlist the help of General Aliyu Momoh to coordinate the various military 
units to rig the gubernatorial election, interfere with political opposition, and suppress voters.(Sahara Reporters, 
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2016). The objective of this paper therefore is to examine the rigging allegations and establish its impact on the 
outcome of the June 21, 2014 governorship elections in Ekiti state. 
 
2. Methodology 
Empirical methods adopted for the study included interview with representatives of civil servants unions, and 
political actors as well as semi-structured questionnaires among fifty informally employed traders and artisans in 
the state capital, Ado-Ekiti. Participant observation, content analysis of the available relevant primary and 
secondary materials were carried out.   
 
3.  Conceptual Clarification 
3.1 Ekitigate  
This is the alleged plot masterminded by the PDP governorship candidate, Ayodele Fayose, former Minister of 
State for Defence, Musiliu Obanikoro and former Minister of Police Affairs, Jelili Adesiyan to convince the 
former President Goodluck Jonathan to support the rigging of the Ekiti state June 21, 2014 governorship election, 
and the use of the military personnel in the state to intimidate, oppress and suppress voters and the opposition all 
in the bid to favor the PDP in that election. 
 
3.2 Protest Vote 
According to Collins dictionary, protest vote is a vote cast for someone other than the candidate who might have 
expected it, in order to show the voter's discontent.  
Protest vote find theoretical underpin in loss aversion theory. Loss aversion theory states that voters are 
more likely to use their vote to avoid the impact of an unfavorable policy rather than supporting a favorable 
policy. (Kahneman/ Tversky (1991). 
As our field research revealed later in this paper, not a few believe that there were protest votes against 
the All Progressive Congress (APC) government during the 2014 governorship election.(Nairaland, 2014) 
Durotoye (2014a) attributed the outcome of the 2014 Ekiti governorship election in part to protest vote 
as a result of “Use and Dump Politics”, “Failed Political Promises and insensitive Policies” of the APC 
government. p.62  
“Some of the artisans interviewed seemed to agree on this factor they call ‘use and dump’. They 
claimed they worked assiduously for Fayemi’s victory in 2007 and also for the party in 2011 legislative elections. 
Fayemi became inaccessible as soon as he reclaimed his mandate at the Appeal court in 2010…Fayemi 
embarked on civil service re-organization as soon as he became governor in 2010. This did not go down well 
with the state civil servants…. Fayemi tried to compel teachers to sit for examinations thrice, but thrice he failed 
because the Teachers’ Union embarked on industrial action each time a date was fixed for the test….Fayemi 
committed political suicide by antagonizing a core constituency – students. …..With the broken promise to 
reduce tuition…the students overwhelmingly voted against Fayemi” p.63 
 
4. Elections and Electoral Politics in Nigeria 
Free and fair election is the benchmark of democracy. Elections allow the people to decide who governs them. 
Election is therefore a post mortem that investigates the record of office holders to ascertain whether they have 
kept faith with their election promises or not.  
Durotoye (2015),  Osinachukwu and Jawan (2011), Kwasau (2013) have asserted that election rigging 
has been a constant factor in Nigeria’s democratic process since independence.  
Electoral frauds include illegal printing of voters’ cards, illegal possession of ballot boxes, stuffing of 
ballot boxes, falsification of election results, illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers, infant voting, compilation of 
fictitious names on voters’ lists, illegal compilation of separate voters’ lists, illegal printing of forms used for 
collection and declaration of election results, deliberate refusal to supply election materials to certain areas, 
announcing results in places where no elections were held, switching and unauthorized announcement of results, 
harassment of candidates, agents and voters, change of list of electoral officials, as well as box- inflation of 
figures, use of police and security operatives to terrorize opponents and rival party agents, among others. 
Unfortunately, politicians and electoral officials who perpetrated election manipulation have always 
gone scot free.  
The perennial problem of lack of credible and democratic electoral process has been linked with the 
phenomenon of “failed, uncaring and unresponsive governance” in Nigeria. (Inokoba and Kumokor, 2011:139).  
Nigeria’s electoral institutions and processes have not typically been celebrated for spectacular probity. 
A more usual characterization is found in Suberu (2010) who laments the ‘monumental electoral shenanigans’ 
that have come to be associated with political contests at all levels in Nigeria. Because of their enormous (and 
inordinate) influence on political dynamics in Nigeria, federal-level presidential elections have more often 
inspired such dire evaluations by scholars and observers of electoral politics in Nigeria. State-level contests in 
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Nigeria, when they have received scholarly attention, have often been considered a reflection if not an 
intensification of the ills of the federal-level—except this time under conditions of even less scrutiny and 
increased impunity (Hoffmann 2011). The era coinciding with the tenure of PDP President Olusegun Obasanjo 
in particular, which began with Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 is remembered for elections which in 
Obasanjo’s own infamous words were generally understood to be a ‘do or die affair’. In fact, so marred with 
violence and misconduct were the 2007 elections which saw a term-limited Obasanjo hand over power to a PDP 
governor Umaru Musa Yar’adua, generally understood to be Obasanjo’s hand-picked successor that President 
Umaru Musa Yar’adua after his resumption of office was reported to have himself publicly condemned the 
elections that brought him to power (Human Rights Watch, 2007).  
However, more recent federal and state elections have provided citizens, scholars, and observers with 
slightly more cause for optimistic evaluations of the trajectory of electoral politics in Nigeria. The Presidential 
election in 2011 which brought Goodluck Jonathan to power featured a significantly lessened degree of outright 
chicanery and even received the (perhaps exaggerated) commendation from the American Ambassador to 
Nigeria at the time of having been “arguably the most credible and transparent elections in the country’s history 
as an independent nation”. (McCulley 2011). Key factors which contributed to the credibility of these polls and 
have remained a central part of subsequent electoral outings in Nigeria include increased scrutiny by local civil 
society and international observer groups, particularly employing traditional and online media, the (by and large) 
helpful presence of military and state-security service officials, and vibrant participation by the general electorate 
(Akhaine, 2011).  
But perhaps most crucial to the incremental improvements in electoral landscape in 2011 and beyond 
have been institutional developments, particularly relating to INEC’s electoral  management, which have 
reduced some of the more overt and previously characteristic instances of misconduct. As Akhaine (2011) 
rightly emphasizes, the appointment of well-regarded president of the radical Academic Staff Union of 
Universities (ASUU), Professor Attahiru Jega, as head of INEC marked a critical injection of independence and 
credibility into Nigeria’s most important and previously most disavowed electoral institution. The unilateral vote 
of confidence Jega received from the National Council of State in 2011 further affirmed his impeccable 
credentials.  
But beyond the appointment of a reputable INEC chairman, this moment also underscored other critical 
interventions made to the institutional architecture of Nigeria’s electoral system with former Vice-president 
Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the Presidency shortly after the death of incumbent President Yar’adua. 
Such key reforms to which the relative success of the 2011 elections were attributed include INEC’s overhaul of 
the existing but highly distrusted national voter register with its national drive to reregister voters collecting 
biometric data launched in 2011. Equally of note was INEC’s introduction of a new ‘hybrid collation’ procedure 
whereby voting returns would first be counted and declared at each polling unit (PU) in order to add a further 
layer of accountability by decreasing the chance that results from individual Polling Units (PUs) would be 
altered when aggregated at central collation points. Yet another key introduction in this period, which, as we 
further discuss, bore a notable if overlooked significance in the 2014 Ekiti polls, was INEC’s introduction of 
what it termed the Re-modified Open Ballot System. This new system featuring a two-stage process in which 
voters are first accredited before individual balloting in concealed booths commences was praised for 
contributing both to increasing the discretion of the voting process and reduced opportunities for multiple voting 
in 2011 general elections.  
Subsequent state-level polls after 2011 presented INEC with the opportunity to both reaffirm the strides 
it had made and demonstrate key lessons learned from the 2011 elections. Despite recorded hiccups in the area of 
logistics at several PUs and worryingly low turnouts, off-term governorship elections in Ondo and Edo states 
held in 2012 were celebrated as indicative of INEC’s generally improved managerial acumen. Yet the Anambra 
state election in 2013 proved a worrying reminder of existing pitfalls in INEC’s structure and capacity. Usual 
logistical snags of ballot papers and polling officials arriving several hours behind schedule were widely reported. 
But even more distressing was the revelation that an INEC official conniving with a political party had 
deliberately withheld election materials across a significant number of PUs in Idemili North Local Government 
Area of Anambra. The official was ultimately surrendered to the police, INEC issued a partial apology for its 
underperformance, and polls were shortly rescheduled in the areas affected by the sabotage, but the incident, the 
broader logistical shortcomings, and the controversy these issues generated drew into doubt INEC’s apparent 
improvements and set an unsteady tone for INEC’s subsequent challenge, the 2014 governorship Election in 
Ekiti.  
Beyond issues of electoral management, a number of key developments related to the broader political 
context in Nigeria, which served as a backdrop for the Ekiti polls are worth highlighting. The APC, which was 
formed as a national coalition of opposition parties not long before the Ekiti election in anticipation of the 
approaching 2015 presidential election, drew much of its support base from Nigeria’s northern and southwestern 
regions where opposition parties maintained control over a significant proportion of governorship seats. Its 
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cross-national spread, the combined governorship seats it controlled at the onset and its early success at courting 
disgruntled PDP powerbroker cast the APC as the first potentially overpowering challenge the ruling PDP would 
have faced in its 15 years at the helm. Significantly, all but one of the six governors in the southwest including 
Fayemi belonged to the southwest bloc of the APC coalition, which prior to the merger was known as the Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Given this configuration, the Ekiti election represented an opportunity both for the 
PDP to gain a crucial foothold in the opposition dominant southwest before it was to face its most determined 
challenge in 2015 and for the APC to demonstrate its credibility and shore up its mandate in the heart of its 
traditional stronghold. In addition to these dynamics, the fact that this was an off-term election—since the legal 
ruling that brought Fayemi to power had set the electoral schedule in Ekiti off from the usually coinciding state 
and federal elections—served to center the national focus on Ekiti polls, further elevating the stakes for the 
competing parties. For activists and observers around the country and beyond following on online media, the 
unique tag “Ekiti Decides” was created to track events in Ekiti immediately as they unfolded. The stage was set 
for a hotly contested showdown.  
 
5. Citizens’ Responses from Empirical Work 
The authors’ empirical work did reveal interesting rationales for voting and a significant level of confidence 
among a number of key constituencies regarding the importance of their votes in the final electoral outcome. The 
authors’ interviews with representatives of civil servants unions and semi-structured questionnaires among fifty 
informally employed traders and artisans in the state capital, Ado-Ekiti were particularly useful in shedding light 
on broad voting patterns which played a decisive role in the Ekiti election and might provide opportunities for 
further study in state-level electoral contests elsewhere. Similar to the conclusions of Resnick’s (2014) study of 
urban populism in Zambia, Senegal, and Kenya, it appeared that candidates’ abilities to both demonstrate 
congruence between their policies and the priorities of key constituencies and to exhibit differentiation from the 
other candidates in competition increased their chances of winning electoral support. Crucially, it was evident 
that among both key constituencies, personality, patronage and broad policy positions were the key axes upon 
which electoral decisions, largely in favour of Fayose, had turned. 
Civil servants were a particularly important group to interview, not only because they had been courted 
by all the major candidates throughout the campaign but, relatedly, because the civil service is generally 
understood to be the primary employer of labor in the state. Given their demographic importance in states like 
Ekiti and many others in Nigeria, civil servants can exact a significant effect on electoral outcomes dependent on 
their relationship with the incumbent governor. As earlier discussed, Fayemi’s reform initiatives in the area of 
teacher testing, but also in regulating the payroll system to limit opportunities for fraud, were viewed with 
suspicion within the civil service. This distrust was partially stoked by Fayose and the PDP as an electoral tactic. 
But, as several civil servants confessed in interviews, the level of distrust also had much to do with a prevailing 
feeling that Fayemi’s reform efforts were drastic and impersonal. These were often justified both with reference 
to Fayemi’s perceived personality traits and with reference to personal style. Frequently mentioned were 
accusations of personal arrogance and his style of refined diction or ‘speaking grammar’. Interestingly, for many 
civil servants interviewed, the latter trait was paradoxically both a source of pride in an erudite ‘son of Ekiti’ —a 
state with the motto ‘the fountain of knowledge’ which is often referred to as one of the most highly educated 
states in Nigeria—and a sign of his alienation from the lives of ‘ordinary people’. Given this distrust, Fayose’s 
frequent mobilization of local idioms of authenticity and his outright denunciation of many of Fayemi’s reform 
initiatives allowed him exhibit both differentiation from his key opponent, and congruence with key priorities of 
this demographic.  
Likewise, the perspectives of informally employed workers in Ado-Ekiti also provided a useful lens 
into the relative strengths of the forms of mobilization employed by both candidates. As Resnick (2014) 
interestingly points out, the urban poor and informally employed in major cities across Africa is an increasingly 
powerful electoral constituency due to the staggering rates of population growth among this demographic. 
Though Resnick’s study observes this trend in larger cities such as Dakar and Lusaka, the increasing electoral 
influence of the urban poor is an even more pertinent dynamic in cities such as Ado-Ekiti where opportunities 
for formal employment are even less present and where, according to the UN 2014 urbanization report, the next 
wave of urban population growth will occur in the coming decade. This will therefore be a key demographic to 
observe as state-level electoral politics evolve in Nigeria.  
Like the civil servants, key aspects, which appeared to drive electoral choice in this demographic, were 
issues of policy and personality. Fayose was overwhelmingly the preferred candidate among the 50 traders 
randomly selected across market sites in Ado-Ekiti (47/50 expressed support for Fayose), and his perceived 
‘closeness to ordinary people’ and ‘generosity’ were often the reasons why he was considered the preferred 
candidate. But rather than the issue of ‘stomach infrastructure’ which had preoccupied commentators around the 
election, what, interestingly, seemed to be the more pertinent reason for Fayose’s success among this 
demographic was his apparent trustworthiness in taking care of civil servants salaries and allowances which by 
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extension meant taking care of the informally employed who considered civil servants to be their number one 
customer base. The significant rate of informal workers who considered Fayemi’s reform policies to be an attack 
on civil servant’s allowances and, by extension, an attack on ‘ordinary people’ explained why Fayose’s apparent 
‘generosity’ was so salient. The third main candidate Opeyemi Bamidele of the Labor Party who, despite his 
significantly less proportion of votes in the final tally, was often a familiar name to interviewees in this 
demographic was also often associated with the policies and programs of the Fayemi government since Bamidele 
and Fayemi had initially emerged from the same party. In a sociological and demographic context in which 
nuanced information on policy issues is less common than political rumor, it is easy to understand how such 
evaluations of personality can become a central source of information regarding candidate’s policy positions on 
important issues. Again Fayose’s ability to demonstrate both congruence with the priorities of this constituency, 
and differentiation from his key opponents was key in his successful mobilization of their political allegiance.  
Another key point of interest, which emerged from conversations with these constituencies, is that, despite the 
shortcomings of INEC and later revelations of possible widespread rigging, the electoral outcome was still 
generally considered to be a fair reflection of the preferences of virtually all the individuals interviewed. This 
perhaps points to an increasing level of trust for INEC as it records more instances of commendable electoral 
management, but also potentially evinces a growing sense of political empowerment among critical state-level 
constituencies eager to effect political change through the ballot.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The credibility of the Ekiti 2014 governorship election came under a serious challenge after Fayose had assumed 
office with the release of an incriminating recording (which has earned the name ‘Ekitigate’) of Fayose and a 
number of highly placed officials in the military and federal security agencies discussing vague plans to ‘settle 
the matter’ on the eve of the elections. 
However, what these triumphs and challenges revealed more clearly was the extent to which, despite 
INEC’s improvements, electoral politics in Nigeria remained a game of significant ambiguity. The fact that even 
a high-ranking PDP official confessed the use of federal might to influence election outcome illustrated this 
lingering uncertainty in terms of both credibility and the effectiveness of various forms of mobilization, which 
continued to define the political terrain. 
Two days to the June 21 governorship election, some leaders of the APC including the then governor of 
Rivers state, Rotimi Amaechi were barred by security agents who had been deployed in Ekiti state from entering 
Ekiti to attend the APC rally. This no doubt was an abuse of federal power to give the PDP candidate an undue 
advantage. The overzealousness of security officials who restricted the movement of some APC Governors into 
Ekiti and the arbitrary arrest of some officers of the party also prevented the APC from perfecting its last minute 
plans for the election. One of those plans included the distribution of money to all the 177 wards to influence 
voters in favor of its candidate. Even where the money got to the ward level, party officials were not able to 
share the money before the election due to the heavy presence of security personnel. The security personnel were 
said to have looked the other way when PDP was distributing money two days before the election (Durotoye, 
2014a).  
But as our field research revealed, internal disharmony and dictatorship with the APC, aversion to 2nd 
Term Syndrome, emotions & Personality Preference,  youth unemployment, and capital flight, use and dump 
politics, insensitive policies among others were all fingered as contributing to the loss of APC in the 2014 
election. (Ibid, 2014a). 
Ultimately, the electorates have prevailed. Fayemi, to many, was an outsider who “should go back to 
Ghana”.  
Broadly, it has been argued that the strategies to win votes pursued by Fayemi and Fayose, the main 
candidates in competition, and the ultimate success of Fayose’s approach reflected both particular issues of 
salience to voters in Ekiti and the increasingly formal yet persistently unsteady electoral institutional context in 
Nigeria. INEC’s improving management record provided a boost of confidence to both politicians and the 
electorate regarding the sanctity of votes in the Ekiti election. Civil servant unions and the urban poor, critical 
constituencies which perceived and asserted a greater influence in the Ekiti polls given this increased political 
space, represent important demographic whose influence in state electoral contests across Nigeria calls for 
further investigation. Yet lingering ambiguities related to the deployment of federal security forces, the influence 
of malpractice, and the exact promise of various forms of mobilization accounted for the palpable sense of 
surprise across the political divide at the final electoral outcome. These responses revealed that the 2014 Ekiti 
election reflected a moment in the trajectory of state electoral politics in Nigeria that epitomized what may be 
understood as a politics of uncertainty.  
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